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a world in which events happen because there are sufficient 
antecedent conditions for their happening. The 'random model' is 
not one that we are willing to accept as a reflection of how things 
are. The rationale for (P') depends on such a model, and so there 
is no reason whatsoever to accept (P'). 
VI 
We have looked rather carefully here at the claim that it is not 
possible that an event happens at some time after an infinite number 
of events have passed, because, at any point in an infinite series of 
events, 'it would have happened already'. We have not found any 
rationale for it, and it is now extremely difficult even dimly to 
imagine how such a thing might go. On the other hand, it is hardly 
less difficult to imagine how one could give a demonstration of the 
principled impossibility of there being any such rationale. Grand 
'Kantian' manoeuvres are seldom successful. Specific arguments 
need specific consideration. 
University of Missouri-St Louis, 
8001 Natural Bridge Road, 
St. Louis, Missouri 63121, U.S.A. 
( DAVID A. CONWAY 1984 
SORABJI AND THE DILEMMA OF DETERMINISM 
By PAUL RUSSELL 
IN Necessity, Cause and Blame (London: Duckworth, 1980) 
Richard Sorabji attempts to develop a notion of moral respons- 
ibility which does not get caught on either horn of a well known 
dilemma. One horn is the argument that if an action was caused then 
it must have been necessary and therefore could not be one for 
which the agent is responsible. The other horn is the argument that 
if the action was not caused then it is inexplicable and random and 
therefore not something which the agent can be responsible for. 
Sorabji denies that what is caused is always necessitated. Causes are 
primarily explanatory rather than necessitating. This established, 
Sorabji hopes to show that action open to moral scrutiny may be 
caused without being necessitated and the dilemma collapses. I will 
argue that this strategy runs into serious difficulties. 
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I 
Sorabji argues that desires and beliefs are causes of action, and 
clearly he means to suggest that they are efficient causes of action 
(cf. p. 40). These desires and beliefs, it is implied, have weights 
which may or may not be 'equally balanced' when they oppose one 
another (I use the term 'weight' here to correspond with Sorabji's 
metaphor of 'scales', cf. pp. 30-1). Sorabji offers two examples in 
support of his claim that human action may be caused without 
being necessitated. In Chapter Fourteen he considers the case of 
a child who has equal but opposing desires. On the one hand the 
child wants to take another child's toy which appeals to him but on 
the other hand he equally wants to please and obey his parents. As 
it happens the child takes the toy but 'in the very same circum- 
stances the child could have acted in the other way' (p. 232n - my 
emphasis). We can, however, give an explanation and cite a cause of 
the child's action; namely, 'that set of incentives which favoured 
taking the toy'. Thus, while there is 'no answer available for some- 
one who... wants to be told why the child acted on the one set 
[sc. of incentives] rather than the other' there is nevertheless an 
explanation for why the action occurred. In this way, it is argued, 
the problem of randomness may be overcome. 
In Chapter Two Sorabji offers an example 'in which the case for 
and against a decision does not seem equally balanced'. An agent 
may have 'overwhelming' reason for attending a lecture and 'nine 
times out of ten in such circumstances a man may act accordingly'. 
However, the agent also has some reason for not attending the 
lecture and therefore may sometimes not attend. (If 'scales' are 
balanced at a ratio of 9:1 they always go to the weightier side - not 
at a ratio of 9:1. How, given the analogy, does Sorabji account for 
the exceptional case? If the 'scales' do not always come down on 
the weightier side how do we establish the relative weight of rival 
sets of incentives? This sort of difficulty suggests that the metaphor 
of 'scales' is perhaps not a very happy one.) In other words, Sorabji 
suggests that under identical circumstances C an agent may usually 
do X (i.e. attend a lecture) for given reasons, say R1, but he may 
occasionally do Y for other conflicting reasons, say R2. Hence 
under the said circumstances neither X or Y was necessitated, 
though doing X was more probable because R1 was weightier than 
R2. Nevertheless, whether X or Y occurs they will be explicable; 
X in terms of R1 and Y in terms of R2. However, a serious problem 
remains and one which curiously does not seem to trouble Sorabji 
very much. 
Sorabji admits that what cannot be explained is why the agent 
does X (acts on R1) rather than Y (acting on R2) or vice versa. 'But 
then ought we to expect', he continues, 'that there will be an 
explanation available corresponding to every contrast that we care 
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to choose?' (p. 31). Perhaps we need not be able to answer the 
question which asks why an agent does one given action rather than 
any other action. But there is another distinct question which does 
seem more pressing: given that the agent has a set of actual rival 
desires and beliefs (R1, R2, ... Rn) why, in any given case, does the 
agent act on some and not others? Let us call this the comparative 
question. In effect the comparative question asks if the agent can 
determine which set of incentives become his will. (The notion of 
will I use here is that of an effective set of incentives - one that 
moves the agent to undertake an action.) Sorabji seems to think 
not, and in this he certainly parts company with traditional liber- 
tarianism. What matters, it seems, is that when we do act there 
is some set of incentives which explain the action but do not 
necessitate it. 
II 
It seems clear, then, that the crucial issue is whether or not 
Sorabji is right in claiming that we need not be concerned about 
being unable to explain why an agent acts on one set of incentives 
rather than others which are also actually his. That is to say, can 
we ignore the comparative question and dismiss it as irrelevant to 
the issue of moral responsibility? 
Let us assume that the difference between X and Y is morally 
significant. Action X, let us suppose, is some morally repugnant 
action (e.g. pushing an old lady in front of a bus) explicable in 
terms of a given set of incentives, R1 (e.g. a dislike of old people, 
and a belief that this lady is one such person). Action Y, by con- 
trast, is some morally commendable action (e.g. helping the old 
lady across the road) explicable in terms of another distinct set of 
incentives, R2 (e.g. a love of one's fellow human beings, a pleasure 
in helping people and a recognition that help was required). Under 
conditions C the agent has overwhelming reason to do Y and, let 
us assume, 99 times in 100 would act on R2. Despite this he does 
X and R1 thereby becomes his will. Sorabji's argument suggests 
that because X was not necessary, is explicable in terms of R1, and 
the agent could categorically have done Y he is (ceteris paribus) 
responsible. It does not matter, so it seems, that the agent had 
other much stronger and wholly different beliefs and desires which 
he did not act on. Nor does it matter, apparently, that he was 
unable to determine whether he acted on R1 or R2- in other 
words, determine whether R1 or R2 became his will. 
It may be argued that if the agent did in fact act on R1 rather 
than R2 then he must have opted for R1 in preference to R2 - 
thereby determining X in preference to Y. That is to say, when we 
act on R1 rather than R2 there must have been some 'new rival 
temptation or force' which 'tips the scales' in favour of R1. This 
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assumption of the determinist is, Sorabji claims, simply a 'declara- 
tion of faith' (pp. 30-1). We require no new rival temptation or 
force to distinguish cases where we do X from those where we do 
Y. In identical circumstances (i.e. C) either R1 or R2 could be effica- 
cious. There is no further influence of the agent which accounts for 
the occurrence of one action rather than the other. 
Consider the following contrast. Suppose that in given conditions 
C we have two sets of incentives, R1 and R2. In one case both R1 
and R2 are causally determined and R1 in turn necessitates action 
X. In the second case R1* and R2* may cause but cannot necessitate 
actions X* and Y* respectively - either alternative being quite 
possible. Given that X* occurs it will have been caused but unlike 
the first case (i.e. X) it will not have been necessitated. Sorabji 
would deny that the first case is an instance of morally free or 
responsible action because although the action was caused by the 
agent it was 'necessary all along'. How, then, would he regard the 
second case? As an action that was caused by the agent but not 
necessitated he would seem to regard it as one for which the agent 
is responsible. There is, however, no greater scope for agency in 
this case than in the first. The agent cannot determine whether he 
acts on R1 or R2 and so he no more determines which set of incen- 
tives becomes his will in this case than in the first case. That is to 
say, the opening up of possible actions in the second case does not 
increase the agent's influence over what he does. In both cases the 
agent fails to act on R2 (or R2*). In the first case necessarily, in the 
second case because of chance. Accordingly, the lack of necessity 
in the second case does not contribute to the agent's moral freedom. 
What is disturbing about Sorabji's account of the agent's conduct 
in these circumstances is that it suggests that what the agent does 
within the range presented by C (i.e. R1, R2, ... Rn) is simply 
a matter of chance. The nature and character of the actions which 
the agent produces in these circumstances will be as random and 
subject to chance as the 'rate and route' of radioactive emissions 
(Sorabji, it should be noted, uses this analogy between radioactive 
emissions and human conduct; cf. pp. 28-30). While it is certainly 
true that such actions are produced by the agent's will, it is equally 
clear that the agent can no more determine which set of incentives 
he will act on (i.e. which course of action he will pursue) than 'the 
lump of radioactive material' can determine the rate and route of 
its emissions. Thus, clearly in these circumstances it is not up to 
the agent how he wills. 
It may be suggested that Sorabji's position can be defended 
against this line of criticism if we simply assume that 'a man is 
responsible (excusing conditions aside) for what he does by will, 
regardless of the origin of his will'. However, for Sorabji's purposes 
this argument proves too much; it would serve equally well as 
a defence of the compatibilist position (a position which Sorabji 
explicitly rejects). That is, if we adopt this defence for Sorabji's 
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position then an agent could be justifiably held responsible for an 
action which was necessitated, as long as it was the agent's will 
that brought that action about. 
The above considerations establish that acting on R1 does not of 
itself adequately eliminate the problem of randomness as Sorabji 
thinks. He has limited the range of randomness (i.e. by excluding 
those actions with no causal connection with C and by establishing 
a causal connection between the action in question and C) but 
within C the randomness persists. In other words, within the range 
presented by C (R1, R2, ... Rn) it is simply a game of roulette as to 
what action will follow. That I do X rather than Y, and therefore 
that I am condemned rather than praised, becomes a matter of 
chance (whether the 'odds' are 1:100, 1:10, or 1:2 does not matter). 
III 
There is no denying that at first glance Sorabji's attempt to 
resolve the dilemma of determinism would seem to satisfy the 
demands of both libertarians and compatibilists. On the one hand 
his account gives libertarianism the categorical freedom (i.e. the 
possibility of doing otherwise in identical circumstances) which it 
seeks while, on the other hand, it meets the compatibilist demand 
that action be caused by the (antecedent) willings of the agent 
and not mere random happenings. However, despite this initial 
plausibility, I believe that both the traditional libertarian and the 
orthodox compatibilist would argue that Sorabji's theory suffers 
from serious defects. Their dissatisfaction, I suggest, is indicative of 
the fact that, for different reasons, neither party would accept that 
the comparative question is irrelevant to the difficulties which the 
dilemma of determinism presents us with. 
From the traditional libertarian point of view Sorabji's thesis 
suffers from the same fatal flaw as the compatibilist's position. 
Namely, on Sorabji's account the agent cannot determine which of 
the pre-established alternative sets of incentives he acts on. While 
libertarians, notoriously, find it difficult to give much coherent 
content to the notion of a non-phenomenal 'self', or the notion of 
how the will is 'determined' by this 'self', it is nevertheless quite 
clear why they believe that we need to appeal to these (obscure) 
notions. Moral responsibility, they argue, requires moral autonomy; 
and moral autonomy requires self-determination. 
The traditional libertarian cannot accept that the comparative 
question is irrelevant to the issue of moral responsibility because 
it is clearly relevant to the issue of moral autonomy. For the 
traditional libertarian an agent is responsible in so far as he (i.e. 
a non-phenomenal 'self') determines his antecedently undetermined 
will. Thus the explanation for why an agent in circumstances C does 
X rather than Y is that he (i.e. the 'self') chose to act on that set 
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of incentives. To be able to answer the comparative question is to 
establish that such an agent had moral autonomy and was capable 
of self-determination. Hence, to dismiss the comparative question 
as irrelevant to the issue of moral responsibility is to dismiss the 
issue of moral autonomy and self-determination as irrelevant to the 
issue of moral responsibility. 
From the orthodox compatibilist perspective Sorabji's thesis 
suffers from a serious defect common to all libertarian theories: it 
allows too much scope for the play of chance. Given Sorabji's 
account of the explanation of human action agents may frequently 
and inexplicably act contrary to their dominant inclination. This 
claim raises a number of difficulties from a compatibilist point of 
view. In particular, in these circumstances how could we accurately 
infer anyone's character or disposition on the basis of his actions? 
If agents frequently and inexplicably act out of character and 
contrary to their stronger inclinations we would find ourselves 
unable to anticipate their future actions reliably. In general, it may 
be argued that human motivation is more consistent and more 
coherent than Sorabji's model suggests. Indeed, it may be psycho- 
logically impossible to survive in a world in which people are 
randomly acting on rival sets of incentives. (Imagine how difficult 
it would be to live in a world in which everyone acts as if they had 
multiple personalities.) In this way, it seems clear that Sorabji's 
thesis suffers from the same sort of difficulties which compatibilists 
have found in other, traditional, libertarian theories. 
For the compatibilist the only way in which the unacceptable 
play of chance can be eliminated is if the strongest set of incentives 
is the effective set of incentives and vice versa. As long as this is 
the case we can answer the comparative question. That is, the 
explanation for why an agent in circumstances C does X rather than 
Y is that the effective set of incentives (i.e. R1) was stronger than 
the alternative set of incentives available to him (i.e. R2). In short, it is not evident that Sorabji's thesis succeeds in avoiding 
all the major difficulties associated with the dilemma of deter- 
minism. Indeed it may be argued that in some important respects his 
theory gets impaled on both horns of the dilemma at once. At the 
heart of these difficulties lies the issue of whether or not the 
comparative question can be dismissed as irrelevant to the issue of 
moral responsibility. Sorabji assumes that it is irrelevant. However, 
as we have noted, to assume this is simply to beg some of the key 
issues that are in dispute. At the very least, therefore, we require 
independent arguments in support of this assumption. 
In my view the dilemma of determinism is not likely to be 
resolved by Sorabji's suggestion that what is caused need not be 
necessitated. However, the fact that Sorabji's rather ingenious 
attempt to resolve this dilemma runs aground on the same rocks as 
its predecessors is itself of considerable interest. The regular failure 
of this sort of project suggests that philosophers approach the issue 
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of moral responsibility with the wrong set of questions in mind. If 
we want to avoid running aground on these rocks we must chart 
a new course - we must ask different questions. Most philosophers, 
Sorabji included, approach the issue of moral responsibility by way 
of trying to provide some adequate account of how a responsible 
agent 'could have acted otherwise'. Their problem then becomes: 
how are those actions for which we are justifiably held responsible 
caused? The intractable nature of the dilemma of determinism 
suggests that there is something fundamentally wrong with this 
entire approach.1 
Sidney Sussex College, 
Cambridge 
? PAUL RUSSELL 1984 
SI am grateful to G. A. Cohen, B. A. O Williams, S. Makin, the Editor, and especially to 
Richard Sorabji for helpful comments on this paper. 
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TEMPORAL BECOMING 
By STORRS MCCALL 
PROFESSOR J. J. 
C. Smart has kindly commented on a theory of 
time contained in a paper of mine.' The issue is whether there is 
such a thing as the flow or passage of time, or whether time flow is 
a subjective illusion. Does time 'of itself, and from its own nature', 
in Newton's words, flow 'equably, without relation to anything 
external'? Or is the correct view of the universe that of a four- 
dimensional continuum, spread out in three dimensions of space 
and one of time, in which every event from the deepest past to the 
most distant future finds its place? 
In such a world nothing 'flows'; were there no conscious observers 
there would not even be the illusion of time flow. The question of 
whether such flow is indeed a subjective illusion, or whether there 
is a real analogue to time flow, is the question Smart and I are 
interested in. 
To be clear about what is at stake, consider the four-dimensional 
Minkowskian picture of the universe. The thesis that time is aniso- 
tropic is the thesis that there are physical processes which are 
directionally biassed, i.e. which occur always or for the most part 
in one temporal direction rather than in the other. For example, if 
you light a match outdoors on a clear, starry night a spherical shell 
or wave-front of photons begins to expand outwards in space. 
1Storrs McCall, 'Objective time flow', Philosophy of Science 43 (1976), pp. 337-62; 
J. J. C. Smart, 'Time and becoming', in Time and Cause, ed. Peter van Inwagen, Dordrecht 
1980, pp. 3-15. 
